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Abstract—In the event of a disaster, there is a severe dam-
age/destruction to physical infrastructures such as telecommu-
nication and power lines which result in the disruption of
communication in this areas. For such scenarios, Delay Tolerant
Network (DTN) provides an alternative means of communication.
In Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs), a message from a source
node may be delivered to the destination node despite the non-
existence of an infrastructure and an end-to-end connectivity.
However DTNs are susceptible to security threats such as DoS
attacks targeted at disrupting relayed packets or dropping critical
packets during a disaster rescue operation. DoS attacks consist
of blackhole, grayhole, wormhole, packet ﬂooding attacks etc.
The scope of this paper is to study the impacts of blackhole
and packet ﬂooding attacks in a post disaster communication
network using DTN. Various performance metrics in DTN have
been used to study the impacts of different DoS attacks in DTN
and a comprehensive analysis is presented.
Keywords—Delay Tolerant Networks, Denial of Service attacks,
blackhole, grayhole, wormhole.
I. INTRODUCTION
In disaster scenarios, emergency support communication
can be set up using Delay/Disruption Tolerant Network(DTN)
to facilitate rescue and relief operations [1].In the event of a
disaster, there are damages and destruction to the telecom-
munication infrastructure which result in the disruption of
communication links. Recovery of this infrastructure under
natural disasters take a long time as a result of the extent of
these damages and lack of preparedness or experience in these
situation [2]. In the Great East Japan earthquake, it took over
a month to restore damaged telecommunication infrastructures
in the areas that were affected by disaster [3]. Recently,
there have been disasters which have shown the impact they
can have on the economy and the people such as the Boko
Haram insurgency in Nigeria [4], Hurricane Katrina,earthquake
in Haiti,Tsunami in Japan and the 9/11 terrorist attack [5].
Communication infrastructures with fragile connectivity have
no security solutions from the current Internet Protocols today,
however much effort has been made by the academia and
research groups towards achieving an efﬁcient and effective
communication model for networks with no end-to-end con-
nectivity and variable long delays [6]. DTN is considered
as an effective method of communication in areas requiring
emergency communication support [7] however [3] points out
that the mobility modeling used by DTNs are not suitable for
disaster response communication networks as a result of its
mobility pattern which are suitable for a disaster scenarios.
Recent work in rescue operations demonstrates the use of DTN
in information gathering on disaster victims and sharing among
rescue workers [8], another work (MONAC) [9] focuses on
information disseminated by victims using twitter messages
through a DTN Network which is characterised by a variable
long delay and there is no guarantee of delivery.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows, Section
II gives a brief description of related work carried out on
disaster recovery and resiliency. In Section III, we look at DoS
attacks in DTN and classify the different types of DTN attacks.
Section IV describes our system model and architecture which
includes our threat model, simulation setup and the results and
discussions. While in Section V, we give a brief summary of
our analysis on DoS attacks in DTN.
II. RELATED WORK
In large scale disasters where the telephony services are
damaged or destroyed such as the recent North Indian Ocean
ﬂooding and the 2011 Tohoku earthquake were the power
and communication lines were unavailable for a long time,
DTNs were used as a result of their independency from ﬁx
infrastructures and resiliency [10]. The IRTF Information-
Centric Networking Research Group (ICNRG) Internet draft
on ICN Baseline Scenario [11] recommends three post disaster
mobility models for emergency recovery operations. The ﬁrst
model focuses on victims and disaster responders after a
disaster has occurred by extracting the key mobility patterns
used by response services to model a post disaster mobility
trafﬁc pattern, while the second model focuses on emergency
responders using Random Way Point(RWP) with attraction
points and a more realistic trafﬁc modeling systems. The third
model concentrates on the mobility patterns using video trafﬁc
over MANET with the integration of the emergency overlay
protocol into the DTN architecture using the ferry transport
scheme. There are many approaches in DTN to provide con-
nectivity, one of them is using a controllable mobility pattern
with a message ferry scheme to provide connectivity [12]. The
process of evacuating disaster victims from the incident area
after a disaster requires the use of a realistic mobility contact
pattern. A related literature in crisis management investigates
a worst case scenario with a few mobile users available,
they evaluate the performance of Epidemic and HiBOp with
special interest in the overhead ratio, latency and message
loss rate. Their evaluation results show that multi-copy routing
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protocols perform better than ﬂooding protocols like Epidemic
when the message generated by the node is more than what
the DTN can accommodate based on the size of the buffer
and the bandwidth available [13]. Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
(VANET) and Vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks (VDTN) are
also used to provide emergency support in disaster scenarios.
The use of hybrid DTN as an auxiliary mechanism in the
distribution of warning messages from a control centre for
public safety is proposed by [14]. Similarly, the gathering
of information from the public to the control centre with an
emergency routing scheme which is a directional-based routing
protocol via vehicles to vehicles is proposed by [15].
III. DENIAL OF SERVICE (DOS) ATTACKS IN DTNS
The application of DTN is limited as a result of security
and privacy issues associated with it. Just like other wireless
sensor networks, DTN have similar threats and vulnerabilities
[1]. The presence of malicious nodes in an emergency response
network pose serious threats in data dissemination during
the evacuation process. Traditional Mechanisms such as the
Public Key Infrastructure(PKI) and Certiﬁcates Revocation
List(CRL) are not suitable for DTN as a result of its lack
of infrastructure and intermittent connectivity [16]. Detection
and mitigation schemes in other networks are not applicable
in DTN as a result of its unique characteristics. A study
carried out by [17] on the efﬁciency of DTN without a security
mechanism shows that DTN is very vulnerable to DoS Attacks.
DoS attacks in DTN include packet dropping attacks, bundle
ﬂooding, wormhole attacks. Researchers have focused more
on improving routing schemes in DTN than making security
provisions for disconnected networks or networks that lack
end-to-end connectivity.
1) Packet Dropping Attacks in DTNs: Some Authors [18],
[19] have addressed packet dropping attacks in DTNs as
blackhole, grayhole and routing misbehaviour of nodes. These
attacks are carried out by compromised nodes with forged
metrics that have the tendencies to drop all (blackhole attack)
or a certain percentage (grayhole attack) of the messages to
be forwarded. There has been a lot of approaches to mitigat-
ing blackhole and grayhole attacks, experimental simulations
and theoretical analysis of existing research works show the
degradation of the network when nodes are compromised with
malicious behaviours. Simulations carried out on the impact
of blackhole and grayhole attacks show a signiﬁcant decrease
in the message delivery as the number of malicious nodes
increase in the network and an increase in the latency of the
network [18].
2) Bundle Flooding: DTNs are susceptible to ﬂooding
attacks as a result of the limitation in buffer size and band-
width, malicious nodes can ﬂood the network with many
packets which can degrade the network performance and pre-
vent legitimate packets from reaching their destination nodes
[23]. Flooding attacks consume scare resources as nodes will
transmit and receive malicious packets ﬂooded in the network.
With valid cryptographic credentials, ﬂooding attacks carried
out by outside attackers can easily be detected using valid
signatures. When considering internal attacks such as ﬂooding
attacks, authentication of packets does not guarantee delivery
to the destination nodes thus making bundle ﬂooding in DTN
an open issue [20]. A few techniques [21], [22] have been
proposed to mitigate ﬂooding attacks in DTNs.
3) Wormhole Attacks in DTNs: Wormhole attacks were
ﬁrst introduced by [23] in wireless networks, these attacks
are recorded in one area of the network and replayed at
another segment of the network by adversary nodes [24].
In MANET and WSNs, wormhole attack was previously
seen as a type of routing misbehaviour [25]. Packets ﬂowing
through a wormhole can be selectively dropped or delayed
by adversary nodes to degrade the network performance of a
wireless network. As these packets are re-routed and replayed
in different areas of the network, the security mechanisms
are not compromised which makes detection difﬁcult using
cryptographic veriﬁcation schemes.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL AND ARCHITECTURE
In post disasters, the availability of a reliable emergency
communication network is very important to ensure an effec-
tive rescue and evacuation process. DTNs provide a means
of communication in the non-availability or destruction of
communication infrastructure. There are other disruptions that
can degrade the network and disrupt effective communications
in rescue operations. These disruptions include routing misbe-
haviour and network attacks. We investigate the resiliency of
an emergency communication network under two categories
of DoS attacks. We use the Post-disaster mobility model 1
[7] recommended by IETF for ICN Baseline Scenarios on
Emergency Support and Disaster Recovery in DTN [10]. We
analyse the effect of these attacks on the performance of
the Emergency communication network during the evacuation
process and rescue operation.
We assume there is a DTN gateway which provides connec-
tivity via a geostationary satellite while the telecommunication
infrastructure is down and messages are forward hop-by-hop
through DTN enabled nodes as shown in ﬁg 1. For clarity, we
assume that all the messages have the same predeﬁned size. It
is still very impractical to allow unlimited delays, therefore we
assume each packet has a lifetime and will be discarded when
its Time-To-Live (TTL) expires. The relief operation begins
after the disaster, Casualty Collection Points, Temporary Care
Centre and the Hospital are declared as centres that take
part in the evacuation process. These centres are responsible
for rescue and relief operations which involves movement of
victims from the incident area to the evacuation point, giving
ﬁrst aid treatment to victims with immediate medical attention.
A. Post Disaster Communication Network
In our work, we assume that there are four on-site loca-
tions and ﬁve groups of on-site actors(responders) within the
emergency rescue area. We use the ETSI Emergency reference
scenario for deploying emergency communication TS-103-260
1 and 2 which covers a Mass Transport Accident Scenario
(MTA) and an Earthquake Scenario as our baseline for rescue
and relief operation [26].
1) On-Site Locations: In ﬁgure 2, a brief description of the
disaster relief operation from the incident area to the hospital
which is assumed as the ﬁnal evacuation point is presented.
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Fig. 1: An Emergency Communication Network
Fig. 2: On-site actors and locations for Disaster Relief Oper-
ations
a) Incident Area: This is the area with obvious or
supposed threats to physical/psychological health, properties
and environment. The emergency responders in the incident
area alert and provide initial accident description to the other
on-site locations.
b) Casualty Collection Point/Temporary Care Centre
(CCP/TCC): This area is the holding area, disaster victims
are moved from the incident area to the CCP/TCC area where
victims that need immediate medical attention are taken care
of in the TCC and the others moved to the CCP en-route the
hospital and ﬁnal evacuation as shown in ﬁgure 2.
c) Casualty Collection Point(CCP): The CCP is the
second holding area that serves as an intermediary hub for
the transportation of victims to emergency medical centre
(Hospital).
d) Hospital: The hospital serves as an immediate emer-
gency medical Centre and the ﬁnal evacuation hub for the
disaster relief operations.
2) On-Site Actors/Roles:
a) Rescue Workers: Rescue workers transport victims
to CCP/TCC, hand over victims to responders in the CPP/TCC
and return to incident area. They obtain alert and initial acci-
dent description and forward it to other locations. The Rescue
workers also form part of responders on other locations.
b) Ambulance Service: Triage and treatment of the
injured victims and organising medical evacuation from the
incident area to the hospital.
c) Police: Responsible for guarding the hazard area and
public order.
d) Fire Services: Securing the hazard areas, ﬁghting
ﬁres and searching for disaster victims.
e) NGOs: These are voluntary organisations with a
wide range of roles assisting the public service which are in
place.
B. Threat Model
We present an adversary model which is similar to the
one presented in [19], [27]. We consider two types of DoS
attacks, packet dropping is our primary attack while ﬂooding
attacks is our secondary attack. The secondary attack is ini-
tiated when some emergency responder nodes drop packets,
they create additional packets and forward them to other
nodes participating in the evacuation process. Detection and
Mitigation schemes are very crucial for the survivability of an
intermittently connected network. A successful DoS attack in a
DTN Emergency communication network will degrade, disrupt
and disable the DTN nodes that participate in the recovery
and evacuation process of a disaster relief operation. For both
blackhole and grayhole attacks, we consider 10-50 percent of
the emergency responders to be malicious adversaries.
C. Simulation Setup
To evaluate the performance of DTN under DoS attacks, we
carried out a set of simulations in the Opportunistic Network
Environment simulator (ONE) [28], the ONE has been specif-
ically developed for evaluating DTN application protocols and
routing. In our experiments, we evaluate both single copy
and multiple copy routing protocols. We considered a small
scale disaster scenario using our campus map (University of
Surrey)as the experimental test bed. Five groups of responders
make up the emergency rescue team and detailed information
on the simulation parameters is presented in Table 1
TABLE I: Simulation Parameters
Scenario End Time 6 hours
No of Nodes 100
TTL (minutes) 180
No of Groups 5 [Rescue workers - 50, Patrol team - 10, NGO -
10, Ambulance- 20, Fire Service 20]
Area University of Surrey, Guildford, UK.
Buffer Size 50MB
Group
Speed(Km/h)
0.5 - 1.5 (Pedestrians) and 2.7-13.9 (Vehicles).
The following performance metrics are considered in
analysing the impact of the DoS attacks in Emergency sce-
narios using DTNs
f) Delivery Ratio: - This is the proportion of messages
that have been delivered out of the total unique messages
created.
g) Overhead Ratio: - This is the transmission cost
incurred in delivering messages across the network. It is the
total number of messages transmitted in the simulation divided
by the total number of messages created.
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h) Latency: - This is the measure of the average delay
in the network. The latency is the time between when a
message is created and when the message is received at a
destination.
D. Results and Discussions
We investigated the impacts of DoS attacks on message
delivery in a post disaster scenario. Our results show the
effects of increasing the number of malicious nodes in the
network. Fig 2 shows the effects of blackhole attacks on the
message delivery. There was a signiﬁcant drop in the message
delivery ratio as the number of attackers increased, there was
a reduction in the number of messages successfully relayed to
the intended emergency responders.
Fig. 3: Impact of Blackhole attacks on Message Delivery
In ﬁg 3, the average delay of the messages sent across the
emergency network is presented. Considering internal attacks,
there is a trade-off between message delivery ratio and message
delay. When the percentage of malicious nodes in the network
increases, a message that is not delivered with a longer delay
is more likely to be dropped and the dropped message is
not considered in calculating the message latency. We also
observed similar results in [29] investigating the impact of
message delivery and latency and [18] analysing the impact
of blackhole attacks on message delivery ratio and latency in
DTN routing. However, the Direct Delivery routing protocol
has a higher lantency ratio as a result of the time a message
spends in its buffer before encountering the destination node.
Fig 4 shows the message overhead ratio of the network,
the ﬂooding based routing protocols Epidemic and Prophet
considered in this evaluation have the highest overhead ratio
in the network with Epidemic higher than Prophet. This result
suggest that since both protocols are multi-copy routing proto-
cols that ﬂood packets, Prophet has a smaller overhead because
it makes use of a probabilistic metric that determines the
forwarding decision to replicate a message to an encountered
node while Epidemic is a naive replication based routing
protocol. Direct Delivery, Spray and Wait and MaxProp have
lower overheads since their forwarding decisions are based on
contact with destination node in Direct Delivery and Spray
and Wait, while MaxProp assigns priority to new packets and
prevents reception of the same packet by discarding it.
Fig. 4: Impact of Blackhole attacks on Latency
Fig. 5: Impact of blackhole attacks on overhead ratio
Fig. 6: Legitimate vs malicious packets in Direct Delivery
In ﬁg 5, 6 and 7, we show the impact of the secondary
attack on the Emergency communication network, the number
of legitimate packet decreases as more adversary nodes take
part in the packet ﬂood attack while the number of malicious
messages delivered to destination nodes increases. This type
of attack is more detrimental to the evacuation process as
malicious messages may be aimed at fraudulent activities such
as over exaggerating the number of victims or overstated needs
like requesting for more ambulance services.
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Fig. 7: Legitimate vs malicious packets in Spray and Wait
Fig. 8: Legitimate vs malicious packets in Epidemic
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a comprehensive study of the impacts of DoS
attacks including blackhole, and packet ﬂooding attacks in
an emergency communication network using DTN has been
presented. Comparisons using different performance metrics
for the different DoS attacks gives a clear insight of some
of the impacts of DoS attacks in DTNs. Apart from net-
work degradation, compromised emergency responders that
participate in disaster recovery and evacuation can drop high
priority messages relayed to them which could be request for
immediate services at the incident area such as requesting for
more ﬁre ﬁghters or ambulance services as a result of the
increase in the number of casualties. In our future work, we
will design and implement a collaborative trust management
protocol with an integrated buffer management scheme for
mitigating routing misbehaviours in DTNs.
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